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THE ROLE OF MANAGERIAL ABILITY IN FIRM INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND PERFORMANCE OF NON FINANCIAL FIRMS A MODERATING ROLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

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26 Pages : 309-324

http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/ger.2020(V-I).26      10.31703/ger.2020(V-I).26      Published : Mar 2020

The Role of Managerial Ability in Firm Investment Opportunities and Performance of Non-Financial Firms: A Moderating Role of Corporate Governance

Abstract

    The current study focused on investigating the influence of management ability on the investment opportunity and firm performance. The managerial ability has a strategic impact on firm performance and value. Secondary data was employed. The study takes 369 non-financial firms as a population of the study and 196 firms as sample size selected randomly. The data was collected from 2008 to 2017. The managerial ability, cash holdings and dividend payout have a significant effect on the firm performance (ROA). Corporate governance has significant effects on the independent variables and ROA. The findings suggested that managerial ability, cash holdings and dividend payout have significant effects on firm investment opportunities (total Q). Corporate governance has positive and significant effects among independent variables and total Q (TTQ). It has been recommended that managers with superior abilities correlate themselves with a better investment opportunity.

    Managerial Ability, Investment Opportunity, Firm Performance, NonFinancial, OLS, Fixed Effect.

    (1) Kamran Nawaz
    PhD Scholar, Department of Management Sciences, Iqra National University Peshawar, KP, Pakistan.
    (2) Farzand Ali Jan
    Professor/Vice Chancellor, Department of Management Sciences, Iqra National University Peshawar, KP, Pakistan.
    (3) Syed Kashif Shah
    MS Scholar, Department of Management Sciences, Behria University Islamabad, Pakistan.
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Cite this article

APA

    APA : Nawaz, K., Jan, F. A., & Shah, S. K. (2020). The Role of Managerial Ability in Firm Investment Opportunities and Performance of Non-Financial Firms: A Moderating Role of Corporate Governance. Global Economics Review, V(I), 309-324. https://doi.org/10.31703/ger.2020(V-I).26

CHICAGO

    CHICAGO : Nawaz, Kamran, Farzand Ali Jan, and Syed Kashif Shah. 2020. "The Role of Managerial Ability in Firm Investment Opportunities and Performance of Non-Financial Firms: A Moderating Role of Corporate Governance." Global Economics Review, V (I): 309-324 doi: 10.31703/ger.2020(V-I).26

HARVARD

    HARVARD : NAWAZ, K., JAN, F. A. & SHAH, S. K. 2020. The Role of Managerial Ability in Firm Investment Opportunities and Performance of Non-Financial Firms: A Moderating Role of Corporate Governance. Global Economics Review, V, 309-324.

MHRA

    MHRA : Nawaz, Kamran, Farzand Ali Jan, and Syed Kashif Shah. 2020. "The Role of Managerial Ability in Firm Investment Opportunities and Performance of Non-Financial Firms: A Moderating Role of Corporate Governance." Global Economics Review, V: 309-324

MLA

    MLA : Nawaz, Kamran, Farzand Ali Jan, and Syed Kashif Shah. "The Role of Managerial Ability in Firm Investment Opportunities and Performance of Non-Financial Firms: A Moderating Role of Corporate Governance." Global Economics Review, V.I (2020): 309-324 Print.

OXFORD

    OXFORD : Nawaz, Kamran, Jan, Farzand Ali, and Shah, Syed Kashif (2020), "The Role of Managerial Ability in Firm Investment Opportunities and Performance of Non-Financial Firms: A Moderating Role of Corporate Governance", Global Economics Review, V (I), 309-324

TURABIAN

    TURABIAN : Nawaz, Kamran, Farzand Ali Jan, and Syed Kashif Shah. "The Role of Managerial Ability in Firm Investment Opportunities and Performance of Non-Financial Firms: A Moderating Role of Corporate Governance." Global Economics Review V, no. I (2020): 309-324. https://doi.org/10.31703/ger.2020(V-I).26